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FRALEY

ARTICLE
Re-examining Acts of God
JILL M. FRALEY

I.

*

INTRODUCTION

For more than three centuries, tort law has included the
notion of an act of God as something caused naturally, beyond
1
both man’s anticipation and control. Historically, the doctrine
applied to extraordinary manifestations of the forces of nature,
2
3
4
5
including floods, earthquakes, blizzards, and hurricanes.
*

Jill M. Fraley is Tutor in Law and a J.S.D. candidate at Yale Law School.
I would like to thank my dissertation committee, Robert Gordon, Bruce
Ackerman and Robert Burt.
1. See, e.g., Forward v. Pittard, 99 ENG. REP. 953, 956-57 (1785).
2. Courts differ in their categorization of floods, which might or might not
be acts of God, depending on the magnitude of the flood and whether or not such
flooding is common in the area. See United States v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. CV89-039-BU-PGH, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22885, at *18 (D. Mont. July 1, 1996)
(finding that floods as acts of God depends on circumstances of location and
magnitude); Webb v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 18 N.W.2d
563, 568 (Neb. 1945) (not all floods will be acts of God, depending on how
extraordinary or unprecedented the flood is).
3. See Mega Const. Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 396, 497-98 (1993)
(earthquake could be an act of God, but court here did not find clear evidence of
causation of the damages at issue); Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436, 445
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (listing earthquakes among acts of God); Shannon v. Russell,
203 B.R. 303, 314 (1996) (same). See also Holister v. Maynard, 29 C.C.P.A. 1249,
1255 (1942) (contract describing earthquakes as acts of God); York v. Jones, 717
F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (same).
4. See, e.g., McKinley v. Hines, 215 P. 301, 302 (Kan. 1923) (holding that
while some blizzards are acts of God, the event in question was not sufficiently
severe to be an act of God since similar scale events had occurred in the past).
5. See Skandia Ins. Co. v. Star Shipping AS, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1240 (D.
Ala. 2001) (describing a hurricane as a “classic case of an act of God,” but also
hinting that this is only true of a hurricane that causes “unexpected and
unforeseeable devastation” and that, therefore, some hurricanes might not be
acts of God). See also Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 2d 642, 655
(E.D. La. 2002) (finding that not all hurricanes are unanticipated and therefore
would not qualify as an act of God even if meeting other criteria); Freter v.
Embassy Moving & Storage Co. 145 A.2d 442, 444 (Md. Ct. App. 1958) (even
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Despite the significance of the doctrine, particularly in large-scale
6
disasters, scholars rarely engage the act of God defense critically.
However, recently, the doctrine has received more substantial
criticism. Denis Binder argued that the doctrine should be
repudiated as merely a restatement of existing negligence
7
principles. Joel Eagle criticized the doctrine, suggesting that it
should not exclude liability for damages resulting from Hurricane
Katrina, but his argument rested more on an issue of fact—
whether the hurricane was foreseeable—than a critique of the
8
doctrine itself. With so little attention given to this ancient
doctrine, scholars have yet to consider the implications of major
theoretical shifts in both law and geography that repudiate a
separation of “the human” from “the natural.” Notably, this
neglect has continued despite significant grappling with defining
9
“nature” and “natural” in other legal contexts such as patents,
10
federal food and drug regulations, and public lands management
11
or wilderness protection.

hurricanes are not always acts of God—nor is a single determination about an
event necessarily valid across the miles thus a named hurricane may be an act
of God in one place, but not twenty miles away); Laurencia Fasoyiro, Invoking
the Act of God Defense, 4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 1, 1-2 (2009)
(discussing the difficulty of predicting the behavior of hurricanes and their
patterns). Strong winds may also in and of themselves be acts of God. See, e.g.,
Fairbrother v. Wiley’s, Inc., 331 P.2d 330, 337 (Kan. 1958) (whether wind is act
of God depends on foreseeability of winds of this scale); Jacobson v. Suderman &
Young, Inc., 17 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1927) (same).
6. See C.G. Hall, An Unsearchable Providence: The Lawyer's Concept of Act
of God, 13 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 227, 227 (1993) (noting the lack of analysis
on the concept of acts of God); Denis Binder, Act of God? or Act of Man?: A
Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort Law, 15 REV. LITIG. 1, 3-4 (1996)
(noting lack of analysis of the concept of an act of God and citing limited recent
publications).
7. See Binder, supra note 6, at 4, 77-79.
8. See Joel Eagle, Divine Intervention: Re-examining the "Act of God"
Defense in a Post-Katrina World, 82 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 459 (2007).
Laurencia Fasoyiro also recently commented on the act of God doctrine, but
focused on its application in environmental statutes rather than the utility and
clarity of the doctrine itself. Fasoyiro, supra note 5, at 2-3.
9. See Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM.
U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 194-96 (2007) (discussing the problems of
defining “natural” and the nature-culture or nature-human divide in patent law
procedures which require establishing that a patentable project is not a “product
of nature”).
10. See Daniel L. Kegan & Diane S. Lidman, United States Federal Food and
Drug Administration May Consume Food Trademarks, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 199,
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Currently, the acts of God doctrine continues its traditional
uses in tort, contract, and insurance law, while also being
enshrined in new environmental statutes as a method of creating
a limit on liability when the polluter might not reasonably have
anticipated circumstances—albeit a strict construction of the
12
doctrine.
For example, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act applies the acts of
13
14
God doctrine, as does the Oil Pollution Act. Yet, it is precisely
this context of environmental issues that places the most
15
With
pressure on the theoretical validity of the defense.
increasing awareness of the human role in climatic and weather
changes, dividing human from natural or divine action is far from
uncomplicated.
This article discusses the origins, applications, and utility
of the acts of God defense, particularly with an eye towards
establishing its theoretical foundations and the reliance on the
classical human-nature divide. The article will demonstrate how
the crumbling classical divide is already causing shifts in legal
doctrines across areas as diverse as food and drug law, wilderness

205 (1997) (discussing the FDA’s movements towards defining “natural”); A.
Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update: Labeling Controversies,
Biotechnology Litigation, and the Safety of Imported Food, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y
253, 261-71 (2007) (discussing the history of FDA labeling laws particularly as
related to defining “natural”).
11. See Lee Godden, Preserving Natural Heritage: Nature as Other, 22
MELB. U. L. REV. 719, 724 (1998) (exploring property and preservation laws in
Australia that implement ideas of the nature-human divide); Gregory H. Aplet,
On the Nature of Wildness: Exploring What Wilderness Really Protects, 76
DENV. U. L. REV. 347, 347-48, 366-67 (1999) (examining the Wilderness Act of
1964 and the wilderness idea, which includes a separation of the human from
the natural); Sandra Zellmer, A Preservation Paradox: Political Prestidigitation
and an Enduring Resource of Wildness, 34 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1015-17 (2004)
(examining the Wilderness Act of 1964 and public lands management, including
the separation of man from wild).
12. See Fasoyiro, supra note 5, at 2-3.
13. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1) (2006).
14. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(1) (2006).
15. The application of the act of God doctrine within environmental cases has
previously been criticized. See Brian J. Stammer, "Nothing We Could Do": The
Defense of Act of God in Environmental Prosecutions, 4 ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 93,
93-95 (1993).
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16

Then through a deeper engagement
protection, and patents.
with the geographical theory responsible for our renewed vision of
the human-nature relationship, the argument establishes a
critique of the act of God defense as it has been traditionally
formulated. In the final analysis, the article suggests that the act
of God defense must be shifted to remove any reliance on a strict
divide between human and natural action.
II. THE ACTS OF GOD DOCTRINE
The idea of an act of God dates at least to the sixteenth
century opinion in Shelley’s Case, which found that the death of a
party to the contract made performance impossible due to an “act
17
of God.”
The doctrine therefore emerges in a reference to
general fairness—that a defendant might not be held responsible
for the consequences of an event that he had no ability to prevent
or predict, even with the best possible intentions. As the court in
Shelley’s Case explained, it was an event that “no industry can
18
In an attempt to give life to this
avoid, nor policy prevent.”
notion of fairness, the courts in Shelley’s Case and other early
decisions drew lines between those acts which were natural and
those which were caused by man, so as to forgive man for those
acts that were beyond his anticipation or control. As such
sympathetic cases of contract breach were brought to the
19
attention of courts, the doctrine of acts of God developed.
Over the years, the doctrine solidified to include multiple
elements. In a recent Congressional definition, an act of God is
“an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible
character, the effects of which could not have been prevented or

16. See Kegan & Lidman, supra note 10, at 205 (discussing the FDA’s
movements towards defining “natural”); Endres, supra note 10, at 261-71
(discussing the history of FDA labeling laws particularly as related to defining
“natural”).
17. Wolfe v. Shelley, 76 Eng. Rep. 199 (1581). The act of God doctrine
continues to be available in the context of contracts—a context that will be
largely omitted in this essay, which will focus exclusively on torts. See, e.g.,
Florida Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 18 So.2d 671, 675 (Fla. 1944)
(applying the act of God doctrine as a defense to a contract).
18. Wolfe v. Shelley, 76 Eng. Rep. 220 (1581).
19. See ARTHUR A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1324 (1962).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/4

4

FRALEY

2010]

RE-EXAMINING ACTS OF GOD

673

20

avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight.” This definition
includes multiple elements: (1) “natural” causation; (2) a lack of
21
foreseeability; (3) that “nature” must be the exclusive or sole
cause; and (4) the effects must not have been preventable by
22
reasonable due care or foresight of the defendant.
While the
concept of acts of God cannot be reduced to simply the idea of
“forces of nature,” acts of God are understood to be a subset of
23
these, thereby immediately raising the question of which acts
24
are natural and which are human.
While many courts emphasize the defendant’s ability to
25
anticipate the disastrous event, the very heart of the doctrine
20. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701(1) (2006); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1)
(2006).
21. Additionally, where the defendant failed in another duty, such as a duty
of inspection that might have made the damages foreseeable, the act of God
doctrine will not apply. See Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Biliter, 413 S.W.2d 894,
898 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967).
22. Id.
23. Binder, supra note 6, at 16.
24. An act of God is often defined as an “event in nature,” then additional
qualifications are added. See, e.g., Corrington v. Kalicak, 319 S.W.2d 888, 892
(Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (act of God is a natural event); Tel Oil Co. v. City of
Schenectady, 718 N.Y.S.2d 410, 413 (App. Div. 2000) (an act of God must be
from “exclusively natural causes”); Joseph Resnick Co. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha,
241 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (Civ. Ct. 1963) (act of God is an event that “happens by
the direct, immediate and exclusive operation of the forces of nature”). One of
the most significant additional qualifications is the element of scale, which
moves an event from natural to act of God. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Los
Angeles, 55 P.2d 847, 849 (Cal. 1936) (“unusual volume” pushes natural event to
an act of God); Trout Brook Co. v. Willow River Power Co., 267 N.W. 302, 305
(Wis. 1936) (flood becomes act of God due to extraordinary level of rainfall).
25. See Fasoyiro, supra note 5, at 9-10. A previous event of the same
magnitude indicates that the defendant should have been prepared for a
subsequent recurrence. See Fairbury Brick, Co. v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co.,
113 N.W. 535, 537 (Neb. 1907) (earlier rainfall of similar proportions should
have directed defendant to be prepared); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
Pomeroy, 3 S.W. 722, 724 (Tex. 1887) (history of similar events made the event
in question foreseeable and therefore not an act of God). Some cases suggest
that the act of God defense does not apply unless the disastrous event is of the
largest scale on record—thereby highlighting the significance of foreseeability in
the analysis of the doctrine. See, e.g., McKinley v. Hines, 215 P. 301, 302-03
(blizzard not an act of God since it was not the worst in the region recorded). But
see Garfield v. City of Toronto, 220 O.A.R. 128 (Ont. Ct. App. 1895) (previous
events of the same scale did not necessarily prevent the act of God doctrine from
applying). Courts frequently apply the act of God doctrine where the event in
question is described as “unprecedented.” See, e.g., Sutliff v. Sweetwater Water
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rests upon the court’s strict interpretation of the human-nature
separation. Within the doctrine, an act of God occurs only when
the event in question is caused exclusively by forces of nature
26
without any human action or interference. The courts find that
“[a]n act of God must be caused exclusively and directly by
27
natural causes” because when “the cause . . . is found to be in
part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from
active intervention or neglect, the whole occurrence is thereby
28
humanized and removed from . . . acts of God.” This emphasis
carries over into the federal environmental statutes, which
29
require that nature be the “sole cause” for an act of God. In
discussing the doctrine, courts repeatedly expound on the
doctrine’s limitation to those events that are “direct, immediate,
and exclusive operation of the forces of nature, uncontrolled or
uninfluenced by the power of man and without human
30
intervention.” As one court explained, “human activities cannot
31
have contributed to the loss in any degree.” For an event to be a
legal act of God, the natural event must have been the “sole and
immediate cause of the injury,” with no “co-operation of man, or
32
any admixture of human means.”
Where an act or omission of the defendant combined with an
unprecedented natural force to cause the damages, the courts will
not apply the act of God doctrine; the doctrine is limited to
33
circumstances where there is no concurrent causation. Courts
Co., 186 P. 766, 767 (Cal. 1920) (unprecedented flood); Enters. v. New York, 614
N.Y.S.2d 653, 654 (App. Div. 1994) (noting that “[f]undamentally, an act of God
is an unusual, extraordinary and unprecedented event”).
26. Shea-S&M Ball v. Massman-Kiewit-Early, 606 F.2d 1245, 1249 n.6 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
27. Id.
28. Fred Drew Constr. Co. v. Mire, 89 A.2d 634, 636 (D.C. 1952).
29. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(f)(1)-(3); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §
9607(b)(1).
30. Butts v. City of S. Fulton, 565 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
31. Cangialosi v. Hallen Constr. Corp., 723 N.Y.S.2d 387, 387 (App. Div.
2001).
32. Michaels v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 30 N.Y. 564, 571 (1864).
33. See Schweiger v. Solbeck, 230 P.2d 195, 200 (Or. 1951) (where
defendant’s accumulation of logging debris was a concurrent cause of the
damages, the act of God doctrine did not apply); Okla. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 282 P.
157, 163 (Okla. 1929) (“commingled” causation is not acceptable to prevent the
defendant’s liability); Inland Power & Light Co. v. Grieger, 91 F.2d 811, 816-17
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have been strict in applying this requirement and place upon the
defendant the burden of proving that the natural event was the
34
sole cause of damages. Even if the defendant proves that an act
of God occurred, he will still remain liable so long as the plaintiff
is also able to prove that the defendant’s actions were an
35
additional cause of the damage. In other words, the act of God
36
must be the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages. The
act of God must not only be a cause but also the “entire cause” for
37
the doctrine to preclude liability.
Over the years, the doctrine was expanded to the context of
insurance cases and, indeed, became a standard clause in many
38
different types of insurance contracts. Insurers were willing to
insure against human negligence, but if God was out to get you,
they (perhaps quite reasonably) were not willing to take your
39
side.
Insurance contracts for commercial facilities would, for
example, exclude liability for flood damage and lightning
40
strikes. In contrast, policies that insured farms frequently cover
acts of God but exclude damages resulting from human
41
negligence.
In both types of insurance policies, recourse is

(9th Cir. 1937) (where causation is concurrent, the defendant is liable for the
whole of the damages); Harris v. Norfolk S. R.R. Co., 91 S.E. 710, 711 (N.C.
1917) (same).
34. Barnet v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 222 N.Y. 195, 198 (App.
Div. 1918) (burden is on defendant to prove there is no concurrent negligence).
35. See, e.g., Ark. Valley Elec. Coop. v. Davis, 800 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Ark.
1990) (when an act of God combines with negligence, the defendant is still
liable); Frederick v. Hale, 112 P. 70, 75-76 (Mont. 1910) (where an act of God
and defendant’s actions were concurrent causes of the damages, plaintiff could
recover).
36. Dye v. Burdick, 553 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Ark. 1977) (requiring sole
proximate causation for the act of God doctrine to exclude liability).
37. Slater v. S.C. Ry. Co., 6 S.E. 936, 937 (S.C. 1888).
38. Chism v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-10483, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48575, at
*2 (E.D. La. July 5, 2007) (citing an “act of God” provision as a “standard
exclusion” within a modern insurance policy).
39. See, e.g., id. at *1-2 (plaintiff seeking to recover against insurer, where
insurer claims Hurricane Katrina was an act of God; determination of liability of
the insurer depends on whether the act of God exclusion applies).
40. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., Inc. v. Jackson, CA07-182,
2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 759, at *4 (Nov. 7, 2007) (citing insurance policy by Farm
Bureau, which defined “wind, rain, lightning” as acts of God).
41. See, e.g., R & R Farm Enters. v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., Dep’t of Agric., 788
F.2d 1148, 1149 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing policy covering acts of God but not human
negligence).
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frequently made to the courts to determine whether damages
42
resulted from human action or an act of God.
III. THE CLASSICAL HUMAN-NATURE SEPARATION
The nature-human separation has long been a part of
Western culture. Despite the prevalence of Darwinian models of
evolution, which should complicate our ideas of nature as
unchanging, nature has been seen as older than humans, existing
43
Paralleling the central
both before and separate from them.
44
division of geography, between the human and the physical,
human action and causality have been studied separately from
the physical with humans reacting to so-called natural events
rather than participating in their creation. In short, the natural
45
has been defined so as exclude the human.
Culturally, the
division became so strong that nature was idealized as something
46
“untainted” by humans. Thus, concepts such as “organic” and
“natural foods” have been defined—both legally and culturally—
by excluding (and discounting the value of) human
47
interventions.
In part, the nature-human separation was an inevitable
product of our understanding of space itself—our tendency to
view humans as the actors and the world as the background or
stage, necessary but not pivotal for the storyline. With space
48
historically viewed as an “inert container,” scholars across fields
tended to make physical geography merely a “backdrop to

42. The frequency of such provisions within insurance contracts is illustrated
by the decision of Florida to enact a statute protecting policy owners from
decisions to cancel their policies due to claims made because of acts of God. FLA.
STAT. § 627.4133(3) (2009).
43. David Lowenthal, The Place of the Past in the American Landscape, in
GEOGRAPHIES OF THE MIND: ESSAYS IN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY 89, 102 (David
Lowenthal & Martyn Bowden eds., 1976).
44. Franklin Ginn & David Demeritt, Nature: A Contested Concept, in KEY
CONCEPTS IN GEOGRAPHY 300, 302 (Gill Valentine, et al. eds., 2009).
45. See id. at 5.
46. Lowenthal, supra note 43, at 102.
47. See Ginn & Demeritt, supra note 44, 300-01.
48. Margaret C. Rodman, Empowering Place: Multilocality and Multivocality,
in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE 204, 205 (Setha
M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zuniga eds., 2003).
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49

Such understandings are now largely
historical events.”
archaic, sinking behind a variety of new understandings of space
as socially constructed and contested. In his now classic work,
Soja contested the old understandings, proclaiming that “space
itself may be primordially given, but the organization, use, and
meaning of space is a product of social translation,
50
transformation and experience.” Massey elaborated, imploring
51
us to not “deprive it of politics.” Crang meanwhile emphasized
the human-space connection, not merely culturally, but
ontologically, confirming that humans are “not bodies moving
52
through space-time but making it.” Although these critiques of
the earlier view of inert space are now widely accepted, the
historical tendency to view space as a container for human action
must be continuously recalled because the earlier view
engendered and sustained the nature-human divide.
Unsurprisingly then, as views of space changed, the naturehuman separation became suspect.
Philosophically, these
observations are rooted in Foucault’s embrace of the spatial,
53
which united theory of geography and philosophy and, more
concretely, in hermeneutic phenomenology and Heidegger’s
54
observations on vision, distance and dwelling. Drawing on these
strands of philosophy, terms such as wilderness and nature
represent a way of seeing the world, a particular and chosen view
55
placing the human outside and away from the object of vision.

49. Neil Smith & Anne Godlewska, Critical Histories of Geography, in
GEOGRAPHY AND EMPIRE 1, 2 (Neil Smith & Anne Godlewska eds., 1994).
50. Edward W. Soja, The Socio-Spatial Dialectic, 70 ANNALS ASSOC. AM.
GEOGR. 207, 210 (1980).
51. Doreen Massey, Politics and Space/Time, in PLACE AND THE POLITICS OF
IDENTITY 141, 142 (Michael Keith & Steve Pile eds., 1993).
52. Mike Crang, Rhythms of the City: Temporalised Space and Motion, in
TIMESPACE: GEOGRAPHIES OF TEMPORALITY 187, 194 (Nigel Thrift ed. 2001).
53. See Chris Philo, Foucault’s Geography, in THINKING SPACE 205, 205-06
(Mike Crang & Nigel Thrift, eds. 2001).
54. For a discussion of Heidegger and the impact on geography, see Julian
Thomas, The Politics of Vision and the Archaeologies of Landscape, in
LANDSCAPE: POLITICS AND PERSPECTIVES 19, 22-25 (Barbara Bender ed. 1993).
55. This summary represents a general trend in our understandings of
nature but does not reflect a belief that our notions of nature are unchanging.
Indeed, as historians turn to examining environmental history, we are
discovering the specifics of the variations. See, e.g., Ursula Lehmkuhl,

Historicizing Nature: Time and Space in German and American Environmental
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56

Distance and a sense of human superiority flow naturally from
this separation, as does a sense that nature is passive, while
57
humans are active.
The result is that “[i]n our everyday
language, we tend to treat nature and society as separate
entities. If something is social, then almost by definition it can’t
58
be natural.”
As geographers recognized this process of social construction,
their investigations turned to the impact of our visions of nature.
While the model of social construction may be applied to many
concepts, geographers have maintained that some, such as
nature, are keywords—particularly powerful representations of
59
the world that are likely to be manipulated.
In other words,
“[t]he language and ideas that are used to identify, describe and
explain the natural world are influenced by the kinds of societies
60
people live in, believe in and/or want to secure.” As Braun and
Castree described in their influential study Remaking Reality:
Nature at the Millennium, when we construct our particular—
and culturally located—visions of nature, those representations
then generate consequences for our understandings of ourselves
61
and our environment. Representations of landscapes relate to
culture and identity, as well as larger themes such as the process
62
of colonization.
Particular landscapes became equated with

History, in HISTORIANS

AND NATURE 17, 17-18 (Ursula Lehmkuhl & Hermann
Wellenreuther eds., 2007).
56. As Paul Cloke and Ron Johnston observed, “binary thinking . . . is rarely
symmetrical: it usually involves ‘us’ considering we are superior to ‘them.’” Paul
Cloke & Ron Johnston, Deconstructing Human Geography’s Binaries, in SPACES
OF GEOGRAPHICAL THOUGHT: DECONSTRUCTING HUMAN GEOGRAPHY’S BINARIES 1,
3 (Paul Cloke & Ron Johnston eds., 2005).
57. It is important to note that there is a scale to this distance, and,
historically, women and indigenous people have been represented as “closer” to
nature than the more “civilized” male.
58. STEVE HINCHLIFFE, GEOGRAPHIES OF NATURE: SOCIETIES, ENVIRONMENTS,
ECOLOGIES 10 (2007).
59. See NOEL CASTREE, NATURE 111 (2005) (discussing and accepting Brian
Harvey’s conclusion that nature is a keyword).
60. See Hinchliffe, supra note 58, at 27.
61. See B. BRAUN & N. CASTREE, REMAKING REALITY: NATURE AT THE
MILLENNIUM 3-6 (1998).
62. On the process of colonization and imagery of nature and landscape, see
STEPHEN DANIELS, FIELDS OF VISION: LANDSCAPE IMAGERY AND NATIONAL
IDENTITY IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 5 (1993); Christopher Tomlins,

The Legal Cartography of Colonization, the Legal Polyphony of Settlement:
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63

moral norms—forests with lawlessness, mountains with a lack
64
of civilization —justifying the imposition of outside rule. As the
examples of mountains and forests suggest, the process of moral
mapping varied across environments. Representation favored
certain areas over others, resulting in a multidimensional moral
geography. Then, drawing on certain favored representations,
national identities were rooted in symbolic homelands, which
65
encoded the more desirable social norms and values. Therefore,
by thinking of nature and land in particular ways, we are not
only able to change the meaning of these terms but also to change
ourselves.
While these critiques of the simple nature-human dichotomy
have been accepted as logically valid and philosophically
coherent, theorists have yet to move beyond acknowledgement to
face the deeper question: if “human” and “nature” are not
separate, discrete categories, then how can we accurately
understand the concepts—and specifically their overlap,
connection, or integration? By invoking the model of social
construction, we risk perpetuating the division in some ways. If
what we mean by social construction is simply that our
terminology is flexible and culturally specific and therefore not to
accurate to “the world,” then we continue to imply the existence of
a separate “nature,” continuing on as it is but without accurate
description. As Hinchliffe explained, “there is an assumption
here that the knowledge of nature is being polluted, or watered
down, by social and/or political matters. And, the inference is
English Intrusions on the American Mainland in the Seventeenth Century, 26
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 315, 315-16 (2001); John L. Comaroff, Colonialism, Culture,
and the Law: A Forward, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 305, 309 (2001). For an example
of how these visions of nature differ depending on cultural context, see THOMAS
M. LEKAN, IMAGINING THE NATION IN NATURE: LANDSCAPE PRESERVATION AND
GERMAN IDENTITY 1885-1945 15 (2004) (giving an account of the German concept
of landscape, as contrasted with the American).
63. See Stephen Daniels, The Political Iconography of Woodland in Later
Georgian England, in THE ICONOGRAPHY OF LANDSCAPE: ESSAYS ON THE SYMBOLIC
REPRESENTATION, DESIGN AND USE OF PAST ENVIRONMENTS 43, 44 (Denis
Cosgrove & Stephen Daniels eds., 1988).
64. See JAMES C. SCOTT, THE ART OF NOT BEING GOVERNED: AN ANARCHIST
HISTORY OF UPLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 20 (2009).
65. See DANIELS, supra note 62, at 5; WENDY JOY DARBY, LANDSCAPE AND
IDENTITY: GEOGRAPHIES OF NATION AND CLASS IN ENGLAND 1-4 (2000). Darby
explains her project as being rooted in the question of “how landscape functions
as a repository of social, economic and political history.” See id. at xv.
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often that nature itself remains unmoved by all of this huff and
66
puff.” To avoid this error, we must instead do more than simply
acknowledge our representations of nature as social
constructions. The challenge is to take seriously the implications
of geographical research into the relationship between human
identity and nature, while also realizing that nature “cannot be
67
easily located, described or used.”
Unfortunately, rather than face the complexity of the humannature relationship, we have retained our habits of speaking of
68
human relationships with and to nature, of “human use of the
69
earth,” contemplating the “‘scene’ upon which human culture
70
develops,” and, drawing on Foucault, seeing the corporeal as
71
“imprinted by history.”
These concepts connote passive and
receptive forms of nature as a space for human action. Drawing
on this traditional way of speaking even recent work in the field
of geography describes events from “flood and forest fires to
72
animal attacks and crop diseases” as “non-human interventions”
despite the fact that there is scientific evidence that ties the
73
frequency and origins of all of these events to human actions.
Because we have not substantially developed a new
understanding of “nature” and “human” as integrated, we easily
fall back to the old dichotomy. Other fields such as law, which

66. Hinchliffe, supra note 58, at 35.
67. See id. at 47.
68. Denis Cosgrove, Prospect, Perspective and the Evolution of the
Landscape Idea, 10 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGR. 45, 55 (1985) (emphasis
added).
69. DENIS COSGROVE, SOCIAL FORMATION AND SYMBOLIC LANDSCAPE 2 (1984)
(emphasis added).
70. Kenneth R. Olwig, Recovering the Substantive Nature of Landscape, 86
ANNALS ASSOC. AM. GEOGR. 630, 644 (1996) (emphasis added).
71. Judith Butler, Bodily Inscriptions, Performative Subversions, in THE
JUDITH BUTLER READER 90, 104 (Sarah Salih ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
72. Michael Woods, Engaging the Global Countryside: Globalization,
Hybridity and the Reconstitution of Rural Place, 31 PROGRESS IN HUMAN
GEOGRAPHY 485, 498 (2007).
73. For a discussion of the human role in generating climate change through
greenhouse gas emissions, see Mike Hulme, Abrupt Climate Change: Can
Society Cope?, 361 PHIL. TRANS.: MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL & ENGINEERING SCI.
2001, 2002 (2003). For a discussion of human causation and climate change
related events such as heat waves, heavy rainfall, storms and flooding, see John
F.B. Mitchell, Extreme Events Due to Human-Induced Climate Change, 364
PHIL. TRANS.: MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL & ENGINEERING SCI. 2117, 2117 (2006).
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draw upon social science for their theoretical bearings, follow
74
suit.
IV. THE HUMAN—NATURE SEPARATION IN LAW
Law is itself a site of cultural production, developing concepts
such as the ideal of nature through legal texts and decision75
making. In the U.S., law reinforced the idea of wilderness as
excluding the human and, through the Wilderness Act of 1964,
specifically set out both practice and policy in terms of this
76
separation.
The Act defines wilderness regions as being “in
contrast with those areas where man and his own works
dominate the landscape,” noting the “primeval character and
77
influence” of wilderness. At the same time, the Wilderness Act
defined the purpose of the wildness not in terms of any inherent
value but in terms of its value as a “resource” for human use,
78
enjoyment and consumption. The Act specifically allows for the
harvesting of minerals and timber, along with surveying and
79
prospecting activities, while forbidding development, permanent
settlement, and road construction. The law drew upon existing
cultural ideas to frame the notion of wilderness and then, with its
own tools, generated a series of social practices embodying that
peculiar notion of the wild. As the Wilderness Act demonstrates,
law produces culture, but simultaneously, law is reproductive and
referential, and incorporates widely accepted cultural notions and
scientific conclusions.
In the context of recent food and drug law developments, the
separation of human and nature has distilled in the question of

74. Very few legal scholars show evidence of being aware of the philosophical
conclusions from other fields on the human-nature dichotomy. For an Australian
exception, see Godden, supra note 11, at 720, 724. While a few American articles
discuss the problem of the human-nature separation (such as those already cited
within this article), generally those discuss the problem without reference to the
modern philosophical literature. See, e.g., Andrew Long, Defining the 'Nature'
Protected by the Endangered Species Act: Lessons from Hatchery Salmon, 15
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 420, 457-59 (2007).
75. David Delaney, Making Nature/Marking Humans: Law as a Site of
(Cultural) Production, 91 ANNALS ASSOC. AM. GEOGR. 487, 489 (2001).
76. Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006).
77. Id. § 1131(c).
78. Id. § 1131(a).
79. Id. § 1133(d)(2)(3).

13

FRALEY

682

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

product labeling—the issue of what is “organic,” “natural” or
80
“unprocessed.” All foods sold in our markets require some forms
of human participation from picking and shipping, to roasting
and freezing, to dyeing, waxing, and genetically altering.
Separation of the human and the “natural” is increasingly being
recognized in this context as more a scale than a division—hence
81
the origins of popular language such as “minimally processed.”
Some examples are particularly confusing. Roast turkey, for
example, may be visibly enhanced using beet coloring extracts.
The beet coloring extracts are a naturally occurring, not human
engineered product, but in nature the beet coloring would not be
82
found within the turkey. In such cases, application of the term
“natural”
becomes
increasingly
complicated.
Such
circumstances—particularly in the context of strong American
rules regarding food product identification and misleading
statements—have encouraged manufacturers to demand federal
83
government standards defining “natural.”
As a result of the
changing of regulations within the FDA, trademarks have also
84
been affected.
In the context of public land use within the United States
(U.S.), there is also a significant debate about what is natural and
what is human. Traditionally, the definition of “wilderness” in
federal law has incorporated a sharp separation of human and
85
natural activities; wilderness is a place “untrammeled by man.”
The issue continues to be raised as some public lands are
designated as “wilderness” while others are not. The point
remains significant because there is a long tradition within
American history of using public lands for numerous—often
environmentally destructive—uses such as mining; such uses
were not only tolerated but, actually encouraged by the federal
86
government. Currently more than sixty percent of public lands
80. See Endres, supra note 10, at 261.
81. Id. at 263.
82. Example is drawn from id. at 263.
83. The Sara Lee Corporation petitioned the FDA, while Hormel foods
petitioned the FSIS. See id. at 264, 270.
84. See generally Kegan & Lidman, supra note 10.
85. Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c); accord Aplet, supra note 11, at 352
n.30.
86. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 114-17 (1957)
(discussing the history of mineral uses of public lands).
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are used in some type of development, including mining and
87
lumbering.
The wilderness distinction—one which rests upon
the division of human and nature—is critical to preservation.
The historic nature-human separation, as embedded in both
science and Western culture more generally, has been
significantly influential at a theoretical level in the development
of legal doctrine. Doctrines of property ownership affirm that
nature becomes a possession through labor—thereby affirming
nature and human as separate but for the very specific human
88
intervention of labor.
Similarly, legal doctrine largely treats
land as a commodity, individual pieces being entirely
89
interchangeable if commercial value is equal. Because human
attachment to land is a mere emotionality, law need not recognize
such attachments. (The Wilderness Act itself includes one
example of this rule of exchange of property for its “equal value”
or a “similar parcel” of value). This position is, of course,
reflected in legal decisions on group land rights, religious access
to land for Native Americans, eminent domain, and, most
notably, in the colonization process where law enabled views of
90
Native American land as empty. Although there are many legal
doctrines incorporating the human-nature separation, the idea is
crystallized perhaps most clearly in the doctrine of acts of God,
which dates back three centuries in the law of the United
91
Kingdom, U.S., and other commonwealth countries.
V. RE-EXAMINING ACTS OF GOD IN A POSTCLIMATE CHANGE WORLD
The act of God doctrine gives life to the nature-human
separation, specifically in the context of causation. For an event
to be an act of God, it must be “a direct, immediate and exclusive
operation of the forces of nature, uncontrolled and uninfluenced
87. See Zellmer, supra note 11, at 1023.
88. CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY & PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY,
THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 11 (1994).
89. Jill Fraley, Reparations, Social Reconciliation, and the Significance of

Place: A Legal and Philosophical Examination of International and Indigenous
Cases in American Courts and Their Global Implications, 31 HUMAN. AND SOC’Y
108 (2007).
90. See id.
91. See Binder, supra note 6, at 3.
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92

by the power of man, and without human intervention.” The
human and the natural have been treated here as wholly
separate; thus evidence that “any factor other than the natural
event . . . even slightly contributed to the [environmental
damage] will destroy this element, and consequently, the entire
93
defense.”
The determining factor for an act of God is that it
“proceeds from the forces of nature alone, to the entire exclusion
94
of human agency.”
Courts have clung to this striking separation of the human
and the natural, despite environmental historians challenging
95
the issue of solely “natural” causation, and despite strong
evidence that there is no separation (such as evidence that global
96
warming increases the frequency of hurricanes). Although one
of the very foundations of global climate change is the idea that
“anthropogenic climate change. . . [can be] distinguished from the
97
natural variability of the earth’s climate,” courts continue to act
as though simple lines can be drawn between the human and the
natural. Indeed, a recent commentator described the act of God
defense as meaning “something in opposition to the act of man”
and applying only to those things that “could not happen by the
98
intervention of man, [such] as storms, lightning and tempests.”
Further, the commentator stated that “an act of God . . . proceeds
99
from natural forces alone, to the exclusion of human agency.”
The courts draw a solid line between “earthquakes, fires, storm,
hurricanes, tornadoes,” which are acts of nature and “the
inadequate design, construction, inspection, and maintenance [of
structures, which are] acts of people,” and allocate causation of
100
damages between the two actors differently.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Fasoyiro, supra note 5, at 2.
See Eagle, supra note 8, at 483.
Rice v. Or. Short Line R.R. Co., 198 P. 161, 164 (Idaho 1921).

See Eagle, supra note 8, at 492.
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort
Principles to the Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563, 574
(1998).
97. See id., at 565.
98. See Binder, supra note 6, at 7.
99. Id. at 18.
100. Id. at 19.
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Indeed, the factual specifics of legal cases have given birth to
101
years of interpretation about precisely where to draw that line.
With decades of decisions purporting to specifically determine the
human-nature divide, it is hardly surprising the courts are
challenged by recent developments in the social and
environmental sciences questioning the ease of drawing a line
between human and natural causation. Since the mid-twentieth
century, the question has been slowly rising to the forefront,
beginning with cloud-seeding operations in the 1950s. At that
time, questions were beginning to form regarding human liability
for events previously considered naturally caused. By 1966, a
report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce detailed the
possibilities of legal liability for “weather and climate
102
modification.”
The National Academy of Sciences-Natural
Resource Council and the National Science Foundation generated
103
By 1950, at least one state court decision had
similar reports.
104
been issued in a case of alleged weather modification.
A small
105
body of a dozen or so cases followed by 1965, however the issue
lapsed as cloud-seeding fell out of favor. However, the issue did
not lapse before one judge who suggested that, “perhaps the term
‘act of God’ should be replaced by a concept which reflects the
106
possibility of human causality as well as that of the divine.”
The issue of weather modification has reemerged in recent
years, particularly in the context of flooding. Flooding has
101. See, e.g., Rix v. Town of Alamogordo, 77 P.2d 765, 770 (N.M. 1938)
(agreeing with trial court’s decision to apportion damages between human
action and natural forces); Johnson & Johnson v. Dundas, 4 D.L.R. 624, 687
(Ont. 1945) (apportioning damages and holding defendant liable for only the
portion resulting from “normal” natural forces). To some degree these cases are
the exception; most cases find that concurrent causation entirely precludes the
act of God defense from applying. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Union Elec. Co., 216
S.W.2d 756, 762-63 (Mo. 1948). Thus, most of the work of courts in drawing a
line between human and natural action involves determining whether or not to
apply the act of God doctrine.
102. Legislative-Reference-Service, Weather Modification and Control § 89th
Congress (Sen. Rep. No. 1139 1966).
103. Id.
104. Slutsky v. City of N.Y., 97 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239-40 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
105. Ralph W. Johnson, Legal Implications of Weather Modification, in
WEATHER MODIFICATION AND THE LAW 76, 76-102 (Howard J. Taubenfeld ed.,
1968).
106. Joseph Resnick Co. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 241 N.Y.S.2d 134, 137 (Civ.
Ct. 1963).
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increased substantially in Appalachia in the wake of mountain
top removal mining.
So-called “hundred year floods” are
occurring annually in some regions and this flooding has been
scientifically linked to the removal of the mountaintops (the
spongy green layers of vegetation and topsoil, which absorb rain
107
and prevent rain from simply rushing straight to the valleys.)
As one court recently noted, flooding may result from
“topographical and climatic conditions of the region, . . . the
nature of the drainage basins as to the perviousness of the soil,
[and] the presence or absence of trees or herbage which would
108
tend to increase or prevent the rapid running off of the water.”
Yet, courts have been unwilling to hold mining companies
responsible for the vast amounts of destruction (suffered by local,
impoverished, populations) due to this specific type of mining.
Floods are, as the mining companies maintain, acts of God. The
nature/human divide obscures human intervention, even though
we have known for decades that flooding is highly linked to “the
presence or absence of trees or herbage which would tend to
109
increase or prevent the rapid running off of the water.”
However, in the era of global climate change, courts can
hardly pretend that causation can be determined to be “natural”
110
or “human.” Storm patterns and frequencies are changing.
111
Glaciers are melting and seas
Growing seasons are shifting.

107. See RONALD D. ELLER, UNEVEN GROUND: APPALACHIA SINCE 1945 40
(2008).
108. Frank v. County of Mercer, 186 N.W.2d 439, 443 (N.D. 1971).
109. See Binder, supra note 6, at 15; see also Butts v. City of S. Fulton, 565
S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (human activities—construction work—
had changed the shape of the landscape in ways that prevented the previous
natural pattern of run-off during a heavy storm).
110. See Mitchell, supra note 73, at 2117 (generally discussing the human role
in causing extreme climate events and referring specifically to heavy rainfall,
storms and flooding); J.C.R. Hunt, Floods in a Changing Climate, 360 PHIL.
TRANS.: MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL & ENGINEERING SCI. 1531, 1535 (2002)
(discussing the potential for change in the occurrence of cyclones); Mark A.
Saunders, Earth’s Future Climate, 357 PHIL. TRANS.: MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL
& ENGINEERING SCI. 3459, 3468-69 (1999) (discussing the current and
anticipated changes in hurricane patterns).
111. See Mitchell, supra note 73, at 2117 (human causation of heat waves);
Hulme, supra note 73, at 2006 (discussing human causation of global warming
and cooling in different areas and using the example of Greenland’s increasingly
extended warmth); Virginia H. Dale, The Relationship Between Land-Use
Change and Climate Change, 7 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 753, 753-62 (1997)
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112

Hurricane frequency in the Atlantic has sharply
rising.
113
increased. Events of large and small magnitude have origins in
human action—and governmental inaction.
Global climate
change will present courts with the kinds of difficult factual
situations that make it impossible to pretend the old act of God
divide should stand untouched.
Even though a particular
defendant in a given case may not have been demonstrably at
fault, the act of God doctrine remains analytically flawed because
it requires that “nature” be the sole cause of a phenomenon to the
exclusion of all human action. In effect, the doctrine asks parties
to the case to prove the impossible—to prove that nature can be
absolutely separated from the human. The act of God doctrine is
analytically unsupportable—and yet it continues to be applied.
Yet this ontological reality is the logical conclusion of
earlier critiques: to speak of landscape, as a mere repository for
human action is to deny ontological truths. If nature is not
exclusive of humans, then nature in and of its being includes the
human. The human and the natural share corporality in the
double sense of having nature in common as a characteristic and
having it in common as a shared assets. Drawing on Crang’s
development of concepts of space as ontological, with humans
creating space-time, human-nature may be understood as
multiple points of space-time intersection—points where humans
(discussing the reciprocal relationship between land use and climate change and
explaining how agriculture causes climate change, while climate change also
changes agricultural patterns); see also Martin Parry, Climate Change, Global
Food Supply and Risk of Hunger, 360 PHIL. TRANS.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 2125, 2137
(2005) (suggesting that the food supply will change in the future due to changing
temperatures and such issues as water availability and the heat tolerance of
plants).
112. For a discussion of past documented sea level increases and anticipated
future increases, see Saunders, supra note 110, at 3467-68, 3470-71. For a
discussion of coastal flooding as a result of sea level rises and the anticipated
population movements as a result, see Norman Myers, Environmental Refugees:
A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century, 357 PHIL. TRANS.: BIOLOGICAL SCI.
609, 702 (2002). Hunt, supra note 110, at 1535, agrees, noting the anticipated
future sea increases. Hunt also discusses the glacier melt. See id. at 1535. For a
case study in past and future glacier melt, see generally Myrna H.P. Hall &
Daniel B. Fagre, Modeled Climate-Induced Glacier Change in Glacier National
Park, 1850-2100, 53 BIOSCIENCE 131 (2003).
113. See Saunders, supra note 110, at 3468-69; Mitchell, supra note 73, at
2117. Hurricanes and cyclones are anticipated to increase further in the future.
See Saunders, supra note 110, at 3470-71; Hunt, supra note 110, at 1535;
Mitchell, supra note 73, at 2117; Hulme, supra note 73, at 2006.
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not only generate ideas of nature but are generative of the
114
physical world and humankind.
The human condition is not
just to experience the world through a body but also to be
physically created by our environment and to experience that
environment through time.
By engaging the history of the categories of “natural” and
“human,” we can analyze the process of “bounding or
115
bordering.”
We can reflect on what we have embraced or
avoided through our categorizations. Perhaps at the deepest
level, the tightly policed borders of our historic categorizations of
the human and the natural reflect our very existential crisis: a
worry that life is fleeting, that bodies do indeed return to dust,
that we are more like the other animals than we imagine.
Hierachicalizations have been a constant in this analysis: nature
is either idealized above the human (to be kept pure and
unadulterated, free of chemicals and genetic engineering) or
denigrated below it (to be mastered and rendered passive
“resource” to be acquired and used). Through these notions, our
categories have lent political support to many debates. And by
being either above or below, humans have avoided the idea that
we are a part of the natural.
Embracing
a
human-nature
ontology
complicates
determinations of causality (while rendering them more accurate)
but also frees us from the restrictive Western dichotomies that
have supported environmental destruction (with the human
having mastery over nature), as well as gender oppressions (with
the female regarded as more linked to the body, closer to nature
and thereby less intellectual). Through this embrace we open
ourselves to recognizing truths long held by other cultures. For
instance, Laguna Pueblo symbolic geography speaks of a
“spiritual being who represents an aspect of nature, and may
appear either in the human shape of an animal (like Spider
116
Woman) or in the form of a person.”
In this way, humans and
nature are understood as coterminous—neither aspect being less
than, more than, or apart from the other. Shapes and perceptions
114. See Crang, supra note 52, at 194.
115. Reece Jones, Categories, Borders and Boundaries, 33 PROGRESS IN HUMAN
GEOGRAPHY 174, 175 (2009).
116. Edith Swan, Laguna Symbolic Geography and Silko's Ceremony, 12 AM.
INDIAN. Q. 229 (1988).
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are fluid, generating even intersections (as in the “human shape
of an animal”) while the ontological remains the constant. Only
such a recognition of the shifting intersection—the mutual
createdness, not just in idea and category, but in being itself—
will generate new perspectives in social policy.
With respect to the acts of God doctrine, this suggests that
our current legal frameworks are deficient. By continuing to
embrace the doctrine, we resist bringing our legal concepts into
line with modern scientific understandings—and implicitly
perpetuate the public myth that our actions are without climatic
consequences. In light of other excellent work on the doctrine,
which has argued that the act of God defense adds nothing
117
substantial to our analysis of negligence, the doctrine might be
eliminated in favor of a renewed emphasis on the causation
analysis. If, as Binder has suggested, the doctrine does not aid
our decision-making process, then its usefulness is easily
outweighed by the negative impacts of continued application,
both in terms of public perceptions of the human-nature divide
and in aligning law with our scientific understandings of the
world.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article contends that it is critical to move beyond simply
recognizing “nature” as a social construction excluding human
content. If “nature” is not what we have thought, we must seek
now to determine what, indeed, it is. If we continue to speak of
nature as something separate from human, we are denying the
logical conclusion that nature does not exclude the human: the
human and the natural share basic beings. The two cannot be
meaningfully separated. This article argues that this recognition
is critical in the current legal landscape, which in drawing on
years of culture and science, has defined legal doctrine within the
framework of a nature-human separation.
In particular,
doctrines of causality have sought to separate the human from
the natural to determine liability in tort and contract. But most
significantly, we now continue to separate the human from the
natural while failing to admit the fiction within the doctrine. The

117. See Binder, supra note 6, at 3-4.
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public is increasingly aware that large-scale climatic changes can
have a human causal component. For the courts to continue to
see human and nature as strictly separate in climatic event
causation is to press the public’s faith in the courts. While courts
do, at times, choose to employ legal fictions, this remains a
118
controversial practice, and one that may do damage to the
119
While legal fictions are
public’s perceptions of the rule of law.
generally understood to “enabl[e] the law to do [that] which
120
previously could not be done,” there is a genuine question here
of whether the court should, as a matter of public policy, continue
to pretend that humans are not actors in climatic events, thereby
perpetuating moral ignorance of environmental consequences of
our modern lives.

118. Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 1-3 (1990).
119. Jeremy Bentham, for example, deeply hated the device of legal fictions
and was offended by their use. Bentham was particularly concerned with the
idea of a legal fiction for what it did to the public’s understanding of law. See
Harmon, supra note 118, at 4. I would add that if, as many commentators have
suggested, the primary function of law is to decide conflicts and prevent force
from being the determining factor, then giving articulated reasons for decisions
without being confusing or misleading to the public is of primary importance.
For a further discussion of the significance of reasoned articulation that makes
sense to the public, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARVARD L.
REV. 1089, 1090-92 (1972).
120. Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital
Punishment and the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35
AKRON L. REV. 327, 351 (2002).
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